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STUDENT DRUG TESTING: THE BLINDING APPEAL OF
IN LOCO PARENTIS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE
PROTECTION OF STUDENT PRIVACY
"Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. "1

I. INTRODUCTION
The drug-abuse2 crisis in America has its roots in the
dissociation of people from each other.:3 For young people,
dissociating from one's parents and other adults is practically a
right of passage in modern times, and recent research gives
credence to what parents have always suspected: there 1s
something different about the brain of a teenager.
Parents of teenagers don't have it easy. Door-slamming fights
over phone use and friend choice, late nights spent lying
awake envisioning benders or high-speed car chases, the
futile feeling that everything you says [sic] goes in one ear
and out the other. And as much as parents struggle, teens
will attest that adolescence is no cakewalk for them
either. . . . [I]maging technologies are revealing brain
differences that could explain teen traits that exasperate
adults, including impulsivity, poor judgment and social
anxiety.4

But regardless of whether the psychological and emotional
problems of adolescents have social or biological roots, there
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48fi (1928).
2. The word drug, as used in this comment, refers to all mind-altering
substances, including alcohol.
3. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF .Jm:TICE PROGRAMS, PROMISI:-JG
STRATEGIES
TO
REDUCE
SUBSTANCE
ABUSE
1
(2000).
auailable
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllojp/18:31fi2.pdf (stating that two decades of research
have identified "well-developed social skills, strong family bonds, attachment to school,
and active involvement in the community and religious organizations" as effective
prevention strategies).
4. Erika Packard, That Teenar;e Feeling, MONITOR 0:-.1 PSYCIIOL .. Apr. 2007. at
20, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr07/teenage.html.
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exists a "war" of sorts between well-intentioned adults and
teenagers over how far young people can stretch the envelope
of dangerous recreational drug use, and how far adults will go
to stop them.
Because teenagers are normally (and in fact wired to be)
combative and rebellious, their "army" will never be the one to
back down. This means the adults in their lives have two
choices: (1) return fire by never letting their children out of
sight, constantly searching personal belongings for drugs, and
even forcing their own children to submit to random drug
tests,5 or (2) dismantle these intrusive weapons in enlightened
recognition that a futile drug war with their own children
merely destroys any possibility of developing a relationship of
trust and respect. Despite the relative benefits of option two,
parents often choose to return fire, thus escalating the
substance abuse "arms race."
In recent years, the efforts of parents to prevent drug use
by their children were supplemented and, in far too many
cases, replaced by school efforts to do the same. In his 2004
State of the Union address, President Bush stated, "I propose
an additional 23 million dollars for schools that want to use
drug testing as a tool to save children's lives. The aim here is
not to punish children, but to send them this message: We love
you, and we don't want to lose you."6 A group calling itself the
National Student Drug Testing Committee has even proposed
model legislation, encouraging state legislatures to adopt
statutory language that expressly allows public school districts
to perform random, suspicionless searches for drugs. 7 Both the
President and the Committee likely took their lead from recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.s

5. "So many parents simply haven't thought to drug test their kids at home,
even though testing is a very effc~ctive means of preventing teen drug use, especially by
giving kids a great 'excuse' to say, 'NO WAY, MY PARENTS TEST ME."' Drug Test
Your Teen, http://www.drugtestyourteen.com (advocating and selling home test kits).
6. Press Rell•ase, l'rPsident George W. Bush, State of the Union Remarks on
Reducing
Dmg
Use
(Jan.
21,
2004),
available
at
http://www. whitehousedrugpolicy. gov/news/press0410 121 04. h tml.
7. THE NXriO~.\L STUDE:--IT DRUG-TESTJ:--IG COM\11TTEE, MODEL LEGISLATI0:--1
FOR
STCDE:\T
DIWC:-TESTJ:\G
PROGRAMS
(200:3),
available
at
http://www.studentdrugtpsting.org/ model%20state%,20bill'lo20web%20file.PDF.
8. The Committee hegins its sample language for state statutes with, "[I]n
accordance with the most recent enunciation of constitutional principles by the
Supreme Court . . . . " THE NATIONAL STUDENT Drmc:-TESTINC: COMMITTEE, Sample
Language Inserted into Rxisting State Statute, MODEL LE<:ISLATION FOR STUDENT
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The trend is dangerous. Random, suspicionless drug testing
of public school students will distance students from school
personnel as long as it remains in the school's arsenal. This
distance is exactly what needs to be bridged. By using random
student drug testing, schools are missing opportunities to
redefine their efforts as a realistic movement toward enacting
change. Instead of saying, "We will help you deal in positive
ways with the struggles of growing up, and we are willing to
confront and dismantle the intricate and daunting obstacles
standing in the way of your healthy development," the use of
these tests says simply, "We think the only way to help you is
to catch you in the act, and the best way to catch you is to place
a drug checkpoint in between you and your participation in the
most rewarding activities of school."9
Adults have thus taken a stance that a confused and
frightened teenager might take. They have chosen to engage in
brinksmanship with a group they do not want to consider an
enemy, and with whom they desperately need open lines of
communication. Of course, that stance is much simpler and
safer than one involving honest, reflective, and concerted action
centered on the proposition that there is something wrong with
teenage and school culture, and perhaps not with individual
students.lO We know this intuitively, yet the appeal of a
"blanket" approach, like random drug testing, to the pervasive
problem of student drug use is rather appealing. It is in fact
simpler and easier to do scientific analysis on urine than to
develop meaningful, comprehensive relationships with people
whose brains are wired to oppose us. Why rely on adult
intuition when science knows all about our kids, right down to
Dnu:-T~<:o-;'JT\C
(200:3).
m·ailahle
at
http://www .stuclen td I'll gtesting.org/model%20state%20bi ll'!·o20web'!o20file. PDF. Timing
alone suggests that the President was acting on an opportunity opetwd up by the Earls
decision. handed down only Pighteen months before the Address. The President no
doubt sought to parlay a socially conservative Court clt>cision into socially conservative
policv. and ultimately. law, but this is. of course. mere speculation.
~). For instancP. a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court case upheld drug testing for
studPnt.s involved in extracurricular activities. See Bel. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. H22
(2002).
10. Fell' example. to conduclp that the recent increase in school shootings in
America is a result of an epidemic of individual young madmen would be improvident.
This rising violencP indicates an underlying cultural discord among young pc~oplt' that
is boiling to the surface. Yet. schools, the media, and parents focus their efforts almost
exclusiwl:-· on iclentifving troubled individuals. ,Just as this approach is unlikely to stop
school viol<·nce becausp it is n·active and simplistic, blanket drug testing will fail to
prPn·nt student drug use for the same reasons.
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the contents of their bodily fluids and the patterns according to
which their synapses fire?ll What do we have to lose? What
does our nation have to lose?
The United States Constitution has something to say about
all of this. In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a search
must be reasonable under the circumstances. Ironically, school
personnel do not have to obtain a warrant or show "probable
cause" to search students.12 However, courts must be mindful
that, despite students' diminished right to be secure in their
persons, "[c]onstitutional provisions for the security of person
and property are to be liberally construed, and 'it is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."'l:l To say
that the Supreme Court has carefully considered this warning
when it comes to searches of public school students would be
untrue. In fact, the Court has shirked its duty.
Random, suspicionless searching of the urine of student
athletes was given the nod of constitutional approval in the
1995 case Vernonia v. Acton.!4 Then, in the 2002 decision
Board of Education v. Earls, the right of a school to randomly
test for drugs in the urine of all students involved in any
extracurricular activity was upheld.l5 The courts have thus
spoken on the issue, and the war on drugs lawfully extends to
the government's collection and scientific inspection of the
bodily fluids of the hockey-playing, trumpet-blowing, debating,
cheerleading youth of America.
These holdings must be viewed for what they are. The
Court's allowance of school drug testing policies simply defines
for states and individual school districts what may be done
without offending the Federal Constitution. These cases say
little about what must or should be done. Most importantly,
however, they do little to define what can not be done to
students. Because the United States Supreme Court has not
established the boundaries within which school districts are to
act in the context of suspicionless drug testing, states must
step forward and affirmatively legislate to define the limits of

See Packard. supm note 4.
New ,Jerse:.· v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. :l2G, :140-41 (1985).
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 2H, :12 (1927) (quoting Boyd v. United States,
61G, 635 (1Hill1)).
l·t. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 64(i (HJ95).
I;). 5:3G U.S. H22 (2002).

11.
12.
1 :L
lW U.S.
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these tests to protect each student.
This Comment illustrates the negative consequences of
suspicionless student searches, the manner in which the
Supreme Court has allowed its jurisprudence in this area to
run amuck, and the critical importance of state law as a
protector of individual liberties when federal law itself becomes
unreasonable. Section II investigates the way we view the
school/student relationship through the lens of a recent case
involving the show of government force in a public school.
Section III provides a look at how the Supreme Court has dealt
with student search cases in recent years. Section IV questions
the basis on which public school students have been said to
possess Fourth Amendment rights less significant than those of
the general public. Finally, Section V suggests that state
governments play a crucial role in the protection of students'
personal liberties.
II. SEARCHING PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS: THE REALITY AND
THE CONSTITUTION

On November 5, 2003, at Stratford High School in Goose
Creek, South Carolina, Principal George McCrackin signaled
fifteen police officers, who sprung out of their hiding places,
with guns drawn, into a hallway filled with approximately 130
high school students. Officers tackled some students to the
ground and tied several of the students' hands with plastic
ties.16 Police dogs were brought in to sniff for marijuana in
students' book bags.17 Guns were pointed at some students'
heads while officers shouted at all of the students to get down
on the ground. Hl This nightmarish scenario occurred because
the principal and local police suspected students of selling
marijuana out of one of the school's bathrooms.19 The way the
students of Stratford High School were treated that day is very

16. Seanna Adcox, State Closes Criminal Case on School Raid, POST & COURIER,
(Charl('ston, S.C.) .•July 3, 2004, at Al; see also A.J. Angulo & Carol Marchel, On
Student Rif{hts in the Year of Brown; A Lef{al, Psychological, and Policy Analysis, 2008
BYU ElllJC. & L .•J. 1. 5; American Civil Liberties Union. South Carolina Students Were
Terrorized by Police Raid with Guns and Drug Dogs, ACLU Lawsuit Charges. Dec. 15,
200:3, btt.p://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/gen/l 0672prs20031215.html (with accompanying
link to footage of raid from school surveillance cameras) [hereinafter ACLU Lawsuit].
17. Angulo & Marchel, supra note 16, at 5.
1H. !d. at 5. 7. 27.
19. !d. at 5-fi.
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much the way any criminal suspect is treated. They were
singled out as suspects through government surveillance; a
comprehensive, decisive, and forceful plan was put in place;
and finally, the terrified students, most of whom had no
connection to the marijuana dealing, were subdued by force.20
No drugs were found.2l
What did these students expect? After all, there was
suspected criminal activity happening in the school. However,
even the Attorney General of South Carolina later
acknowledged that there was something terribly wrong with
what happened that day.22 In his words: "Such raid tactics are
well suited for a crack house but not a school house .... This is
an example of a good plan in the wrong place."2:1 Parents were
"absolutely outraged"24 and the local prosecutor had "serious
concerns about the need for restraining students and drawing
weapons."25
One expects the government to act differently around
schools and students than it does in other places and among
other people. As the public reaction to the Stratford High
School incident indicates, one expects government actors to be
more gentle, careful, and restrained in schools than when
dealing with common criminals on the street. Yet, in student
search cases, the Supreme Court has allowed for government
treatment of students that goes well beyond that which is
constitutionally tolerated for the average citizen, as evidenced
by the decisions discussed in this Comment. To get to the heart
of this peculiarity, two major issues need to be explored: (1) the
historical and pragmatic relationship between school personnel
and students; and (2) the type of privacy students can
reasonably expect in this type of environment. The United
States Supreme Court has downplayed the privacy
expectations of students because it has not thoroughly defined,
m
constitutional terms, students' relationships with

20. See id.: ACLU Lawsuit. supra note 16; see also Angulo & Marchel, supra note
16, at 6 ("[Principal] McCrackin witnessed this pattern on several st>parate occasions
and came to the conclusion that a handful of these students wene involved in drugrelated activity." (emphasis added)).
21. Angulo & Marched. supra note 16, at 5.
22. Adcox, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. Associated Press, Drug Sweep at School Spurs Prohe. CHI. TRill., Nov. 9. 200:l.
at §1 [hereinafter Drug Sweep]; see also ACLU Lawsuit, supra note 1fi.
25. Drug Sweep, supra note 24.
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government schools.

III. EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AS TO
PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A. New Jersey v. T.L.O (1985)

Before the nation's highest court was asked to wrestle with
the constitutional implications of drug testing in schools, it
dealt with the basic question of whether, and to what extent,
public school students were protected from searches by school
employees. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the standard constitutional
requirement that citizens not be searched without probable
cause or a warrant was found to be inapplicable to a search of a
public school student by a school administrator.26 The Court
found that these constitutional safeguards would "unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."27 In T.L.O., the
purse of a high school student suspected of smoking cigarettes
in the school bathroom was searched by a school administrator,
who uncovered not only cigarettes, but also marijuana and
writings indicating the student had been selling marijuana.28
Creating a new standard to govern student searches by
school personnel, the Court declared that the legality of a
search "depend[s] simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search."29 Explaining its new standard,
the Court stated that the "reasonableness" inquiry has two
parts. First, the search must be "justified at its inception,"30
meaning there are "reasonable grounds for suspecting" the
student has violated either the law or a school rule.31 Second, it
must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

26. 469 U.S. :125. 340-41 (HlH5).
27. !d. at 340. Curiously, the Court has not found the work of police officers on
the streets to be "unduly" burdened hy the constitutional requirements of probable
cause or the obtaining of a warrant. Are we to assume that catching a student in the
act of breaking a school rule is more important than catching a criminal in the act of
committing a felony. so that constitutional protections provided to the latter can be
justifiably withheld from the former?
2H. ld. at :32R.
29. !d. at 341.
:30. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 20 (196H)).
:n. ld. at 342.
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which justified the interference in the first place,":3:z meaning
"the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.":l:l
In short, the Court defined a "reasonable search" as one
that has "reasonable" grounds and is "reasonable" in scope,
with a "reasonable" relation to the search's objectives.:34
Considering that the Bill of Rights commands the government
not to engage in "unreasonable" citizen searches, one wonders
whether the Court is being admirably loyal to that mandate, or
if its insistence on a circular definition is a subtle means by
which to empower school administrators with a liberal amount
of discretion to search student-citizens, regardless of Fourth
Amendment precedent.
Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the T.L. 0. Court
thought it necessary to reiterate the protections provided to
student-citizens by the Constitution, invoking the language of
West Virginia State Board of Education u. Barnette,:lC> which
held that students may not be forced to salute the American
flag:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States.
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have. of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the younf{
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.36

T.L.O. is particularly significant in that it marks the first
time the Court extended the "special needs" doctrine to the
public school setting.87 The doctrine allows a departure from
the constitutional requirement of probable cause when, and

:12.
:3:1.
:14.
:JS.
:lfi.

Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
Id. at :342.
See generally id. at 827-48.
:319 U.S. 624 (194::3).
1'.£.0., 469 U.S at 3:34 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at fi:l7) (emphasis addl'd).

:n. Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomizf'd -Jurisprudence: Amending the
Special Needs Doctrine. fi1 S.C. L. REV. 2SH, 2G:o (Winter 2000).
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only when, those exceptional circumstances in which "special
needs. beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the ... probable-cause requirement impracticable."38 In such a
case, the Court balances the interests of the government
against the individual's privacy interests to determine the
reasonableness of the search.:l9 Exactly when the doctrine
should apply is somewhat unclear, and some have suggested
that the Court's application of "special needs" is arbitrary.40
What is clear, however, is that the application of this doctrine
has opened the door to the erosion of students' constitutional
rights, as discussed below. In fact, this "unclear,
unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally
applicable Fourth Amendment standards"41 has allowed
government actors behind closed schoolhouse doors to invade
the privacy of students in ways that would not pass
constitutional muster if inflicted upon the general public.
Nowhere is this more true than in the area of student drug
testing.
B. Vernonia v. Acton (1995)
In the late 1980s, students in the small logging town of
Vernonia, Oregon, like many teenagers across the country,
became noticeably attracted to the "drug culture" and student
drug use was on the rise.42 Students "boast[ed] that there was
nothing the school could do about it."43 The students had
lobbed one over the fence. The administration, "at its wits
end,"-11 chose to return fire. The Vernonia School District
instituted a policy requiring all student athletes to submit to
random drug testing by urinalysis in order to play sports. 4fi If
:lH. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (quoting T.L.O .. 469 U.S. at :351
(Blackmun, .) .. concurring in judgment)) (alternation in O'Connor).
:19. !d.
-10. See, e.g., Linke> v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 7:34 N.E. 2d 252. 257 (Ind. App.
2000) ("[T]he drug testing policies reviewed under the special meeds analysis seem to
gain 'a judicial rubber stamp of approval' even though the justification for the testing is
not always clear and thl' ineffectiveness of a suspicion based testing regime has not
been e,.;tablished." (quoting Dodson, supra note :37. at 276)), uacatcd. 763 N.E. 2d 972
(Ind. 2002).
41. 1'.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42. Vt>rnonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 511) U.S. 646,648 (1995).
4:1. !d.
44. !d. at 649.
15. !d. at 650.
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selected for testing, a boy would urinate while in the presence
of a man who was allowed to watch.46 A selected girl would
urinate in a stall while a woman listened.47 The samples were
inspected for tampering and then sent to a laboratory, where
they underwent scientific testing for the presence of
amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. 4H
When a case challenging the policy reached the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia, writing for a six-Justice majority, first
found that the privacy expectations of public school students
were less than those of the general public.49 After all, students
are routinely required to be tested for hearing problems, dental
problems, and scoliosis, and must be vaccinated against
diphtheria, measles, rubella, and polio.50 The Court's apparent
reasoning is that in light of these accepted public healthrelated intrusions, surely students do not have a legitimate
expectation that additional encroachments on their personal
privacy and security will be subject to constitutional scrutiny.5l
Indeed, it is "[f]or their own good."52
Having peeled away a layer of constitutional protection
from the whole student body, the Court went on to find that
"[l]egitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to
student athletes."5:3 An "element of 'communal undress' [is]
inherent in athletic participation", with open locker rooms,
community showers, and even doorless toilet stalls.54
Moreover, athletes subject themselves to regulation just by
signing up for the team. They have to keep their grades up,
submit to a pre-season physical exam, and comply with the
coach's rules, among other things.55 "School sports are not for
the bashful."56
It seems that the Court found that voluntary nudity in front
of peers, a minor consequence of athletic participation,

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

!d.
!d.
!d.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 6fi6.
51. See id.
52. !d.
53. Id. at 657.
54. Id. (quoting

1318 (7th Cir. 1988)).
55. Id.
56. See id.

Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309,

STUDENT DRUG TESTING

2]

261

constitutes implied consent to being observed during the very
personal process of urination by an adult who is present only
for that reason, and whose ultimate purpose is to perform
scientific tests on the urine to discover if something very major
is going on in the athlete's private life.57 However, the Court
cited no precedent to support its conclusion that the voluntary
and incidental relinquishment of certain privacy expectations
allows the government to take advantage of that fact to engage
in further involuntary and deliberate intrusions on its own
accord.
Turning to the character of the intrusion, the Court found
that the manner in which the samples were taken was typical
of the environment of public restrooms, and therefore the
privacy interests compromised were "negligible."f>8 The Court
went on to find that the other part of the intrusion-the
government's scientific examination of a citizen's bodily
fluids-is not significant because the urine is tested only for
drugs and the results given only to a few people.59 The Court's
dismissive attitude toward the intrusions involved here is
unsettling. A man using a public restroom does not expect that
the manner in which he relieves himself and the product
thereof are matters of great interest and concern to a man
watching him urinate. Nor does he expect that his urine will be
scrutinized by scientific analysis or that he will be confronted
with the results of that analysis and have his life dramatically
and involuntarily changed if the results offend the government.
The Court mischaracterized and overtly downplayed both
intrusions, most likely for two reasons. First, in T.L. 0. the
Court had set the stage for eroding the Fourth Amendment
rights of students by putting aside the requirement of probable
cause to promote the "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools."60 The constitutional rights
of students having been overshadowed by practical
considerations, the Acton Court was free to continue down that
road. Second, the concept of in loco parentis, the theory that
schools essentially replace parents during the school day,
pervades the Court's public school jurisprudence.61 Even
ld. n.t ();)C\.
ld.
ld.
New .Jersey v. 'I'.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
()1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2633 n.6 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
57.
58.
59.
60.
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though the Court has been slowly moving away from the
doctrine, when the Court does choose to invoke it, the idea that
parents have delegated at least part of their parental powers to
school personnel-and parents are, of course, free to search
their children as they please62-cleanly removes much of the
inconvenient constitutional red tape getting in the way of the
school's "custodial and tutelary responsibility for children."fi:l
Significantly, Acton invokes, for the first time in the public
school context, the "special needs" doctrine to negate the need
for individualized suspicion in conducting the searches.64 The
precedent for this allowance lies in cases where public
employees were randomly tested for drugs.65 In such cases, the
Court has held that "[i]n limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest ... would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion."66
An important aspect of those cases allowing for random
drug searches of public employees is the fact that the
employees were completely free to seek employment elsewhere;
they were not forced to submit to the tests any more than they
were forced to work for the government.67 In contrast, public
school students are forced to attend school by compulsory

(stating that ''at least nominally, [the Supreme] Court has continued to rvcognize the
applicability of the in loco parentis doctrine to public schools").
62. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
63. Acton, 515 U.S. at 656. Although the Court has expressly abandoned in loco
parentis as a model for the relationship between public schools and their studenb, the
abandonment appears to be entirely semantic. The "special needs" doctritw is not itself
a model for a relationship, but rather contemplates the identification of a need that is
unique to the government institution that is being challenged. In this case>. the> need
cited is the "custodial and tutulary" responsibilities of public school ptersonnel. One
could argue that such responsibilities have their origin in law, but in fact these
concepts come from the traditionally parent-like role of schools. If this were not the>
case, then there would be no "special" need at all. The "special'· charactn of schools
comes only from the fact that they are asked to do what parents would othnwis<• do on
their own.
64. Id. at 65::l. While T.L.O. marks the first time the Court usc>d the "spvcial
needs" doctrine in the public school setting, Acton is the first time the Court did so in
order to set aside the requirement of individualized suspicion.
65. ld.
66. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602. 624 ( 1989); see also
Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. G56, 679 (Hlf\9).
67. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-27.
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schooling laws.fiH Although students are technically not
required to participate in extracurricular activities, they are
encouraged to do so to the point where nonparticipation makes
them outcasts, and harms their social, physical, and mental
well-being.69 To say that participation in extracurricular
activities is optional is to ignore their central, critical
importance to public education. Students are not employees of
the school, nor are they, in any realistic sense, free to choose
non-participation in school activities. As such, the application
of the "special needs" doctrine to justify abandonment of the
requirement of individualized suspicion in schools is a stretch,
at best. The reality of the situation is that the drug tests are
required only of those students who are least likely to use
drugs. 70 Those who go against the healthy advice of adults and
do not participate in extracurricular activities will never be
subject to these intrusive government searches. That is the
message that is sent, and it is undoubtedly heard by students.
To allow fundamental constitutional protections to be set
aside for the sake of convenience, or in deference to the interest
of government actors charged with quasi-parental action, is
patently contrary to the Court's own recognition that school
children do, without any doubt, enjoy the protection of the
bedrock constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy:
"[Y]oung people do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the
schoolhouse door."71
The Court consistently draws a line between necessary and
practical deference to the quasi-parental role of schools, and
the inalienable constitutional rights of children: "The authority
possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of
conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be
exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards."72 This is
a very clear warning that the deference given to schools in

fiH.
()~J.

See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT.§ 1(57.0:31 (2007).
See Heather Miller, Students Struggle to Balance Cluss, Actiuitics, MH'III<:AN

DAILY 0NLI0/E, Sept. 20, 1996, http://www.pub.umich.Pdu/daily/199G/,;,·p/09-2096/news/ffl.html ("Learning happens outside tlw cla,;sroom just as much as it happpn,;
insicll'.").
70. Bd. of Ecluc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. H22, H4:1 (2002) (( ;inslmrg. ,J. dissL·nt in g)
("Petitioners' policy targets for testing a studpnt population IL·ast likely to lw at ri,;k
from illicit drugs and their damaging effects.").
71. (;oss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574 (1975) (quotingTinkL•r v. D''s Moines lnd<•p.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:l, 50G (1969)).
72. ld.
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dealing with students is merely logistical, and cannot be used
to undermine constitutional rights. Therefore, in student
search cases, the Court's justification for schools' downplaying
the constitutional expectations of student-citizens, that schools
have "special needs," is a violation of the Court's own
meticulous efforts to separate those schoolhouse powers that
are logistically convenient from those that can be granted to
government actors only if constitutional lines are crossed. The
reasons behind ancillary benefits provided to government childcaretakers have thus "bled" onto much more fundamental and
important constitutional territory.
The unique needs of schools in dispensing discipline, and
the unique role of school personnel as quasi-parents, do not in
any way erase the fact that school personnel are state actors. or
that students are American citizens. Outside of government
prisons and the military, there are no institutions that place
American citizens more at the mercy and whim of state actors
than public schools. The foundation of personal liberty on
which our nation is built is most likely to crack when the power
of the government is unleashed on citizens behind closed doors.
When that power is expanded precisely because the citizens are
under close government control, the meaning of the
Constitution has been mangled to the point where it is no
longer true to either its letter or its spirit. If anything, the
Court should be especially suspicious of how the constitutional
guarantee of personal privacy is protected in government
schools.
C. Board of Education v. Earls (2002)
While Acton indicated the Court was getting carried away
by the traditional relationship between schools and students,
Board of Education u. Earls73 solidified the status of students
as subordinate citizens with privacy rights no greater than
those guaranteed by the grace of their principal.
High school student Lindsay Earls was a member of
Tecumseh High School's show choir, marching band, academic
team, and the National Honor Society.74 Under her school's
policy, membership in each of these non-athletic activities was
contingent upon her urinating in a cup while a faculty member
7:1. G:l(i U.S. 1"22.
!d. at 82fi.

74.
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listened, and upon the sample testing negative for drugs. 75 She
sued on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the search
"must be based at least on some level of individualized
suspicion."76 Besides the fact that boys were not directly
watched under the Tecumseh policy, the process of collection
and analysis was nearly identical to that used in Acton.77
Writing for a 5-4 majority, ,Justice Thomas extended the
reasoning and holding of Acton to cover the facts in Earls. The
Court found that the driving force behind the decision in Acton
was the "school's custodial responsibility and authority," not
the fact that athletes, in particular, had a reduced expectation
of privacy.7H However, the Court also noted that "students who
participate in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily
subject themselves to many of the same intrusions ... as do
athletes."79 These include possible communal undress and
additional rules to follow.so Therefore, according to the
majority, the reasons for upholding athlete drug testing apply
with equal force to the testing of students involved in any
extracurricular activity.Sl
The Court also found support for its holding in the fact that,
under the policy, the results of a positive test were to be kept
largely confidential and not used as criminal evidence.
[T]he Policy clearly requires that the test results be kept in
confidential files separate from a student's other educational
records and released to school personnel only on a 'need to
know' basis .... Moreover, the test results are not turned over
to any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results here
lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic
consequences.H2
This downplaying of the consequences of a positive test is
both inaccurate and off-point. First, the privacy intrusions at
issue are the urine collection process and the subsequent
search of urine for the presence of drugs.H:3 These are discrete

75. !d.
76. I d.
77. !d.
78. I d.
79. I d.
80. I d.
81. !d.
82. I d.
8:3. I d.

at 826. :-\:32--:J:L
at 829.
at 8:3:2 :J:J.
at 8:n.
at

:-~:32.

at 8:J:J.

at :-\:32.
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searches, the constitutionality of which must be determined by
analysis of each search in and of itself.H4 Any constitutional
right to be free from these intrusions necessarily exists wholly
apart from any right not to be unduly punished for a positive
test result: "[T]he central concern of the Fourth Amendment is
to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive
interference by government officials."H5 Lindsay Earls brought
suit on the basis of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy;H6
she made no allegation of any undue punishment by the
government.
Second, despite the Court's urging to the contrary, the
results of these drug tests have far-reaching and severe
consequences. The Court asserted that "the only consequence of
a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of
participating in extracurricular activities."H7 This simplistic
assessment, while underestimating the critical importance of
extracurricular activities, also conveniently overlooks the effect
that a positive test would have on a student's relationship with
his family, teachers, and friends. Beyond embarrassment, a
positive drug test result is almost certain to change radically
the life of the student, whose reputation would thereafter be
permanently damaged and whose freedoms would be severely
restricted by the adults in his life.
There is evidence, even in the isolated case of Lindsay
Earls, that this "confidentiality" policy was not scrupulously
honored by the district.
Lindsay Earls and her parents allege that the School District
handled personal information collected under the policy
carelessly, with little regard for its confidentiality.
Information about students' prescription drug use, they
assert, was routinely viewed by Lindsay's choir teacher, who
left files containing the information unlocked and unsealed,
where others, including students, could see them; and test
results were given out to all activity sponsors whether or not
they had a clear "need to know."88

Therefore,

beyond

being

extraneous

to

the

Fourth

84. See New .h•l''t'o' v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, :141·-42 (1985) (analyzing initial
search of stuclent'o purol• oeparately from subsequent search).
85. United Statl'o v. Ortiz. 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
86. Earls. :'i:l6 U.S at i:i26-27.
87. ld. at t·::l:l.
88. Id. at 848 (Cinoburg, .J., dissenting).
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Amendment concerns that are at issue, there is significant
reason to believe, if Lindsay Earls' experience is indicative of
other schools' behavior, that school districts intend to use test
results to the fullest extent possible and that other legal rights
of tested students, including possible violations of FERPA89
and medical privacy laws, are implicated by the use, and
misuse, of these test results.
The majority opinion gives no indication that random,
suspicionless testing of all enrolled students would be
unconstitutional. However, it is fairly clear from Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion that this case would have come out
the other way if the policy was to test all students. In citing
reasons that the policy is not overly intrusive, Justice Breyer
noted that "the testing program avoids subjecting the entire
school to testing."90 That this fact was likely determinative in
Earls reveals the Court's unstable stance on the issue. If, by
the Court's reasoning, keeping kids off drugs is of primary
importance, and in loco parentis allows a relaxed privacy
standard, searching all students should be perfectly legitimate.
Upon reading the Earls opinion, one wonders what
happened to the "communal undress" factor that was seemingly
central to Acton's analysis of athlete testing.fll As Justice
Ginsburg implies in her dissenting opinion,92 the majority had
to pull a stunt to get around the obvious rationale in Acton that
the policy was constitutional because it applied to athletes
only. The Earls majority employs the relatively immaterial
language in Acton discussing the decreased privacy
expectations of students as a whole.93 The further explanation
that, like athletes, participants in other extracurricular
activities have to follow certain rules, is peculiar considering
that the Acton Court found "communal undress" and similar
aspects of athletics to be definitive of the privacy expectation at
issue in that case.94
In a dissenting opinion that is simultaneously lucid,

89. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. 20 U.S.C. ~12:l2g (:WOO). The Act
denies government funding to schools that fail to prot<ect st ucl,·nts' rights to privac\· in
certain records. including medical records.
90. Earls. 5:i6 U.S. at il41 (Breyer, .J., concurring).
91. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646. 6;)7 (19%).
92. See Earls. fi:l6 U.S. at il45-47 (Ginsburg, .J .. dissPnting).
93. Id. at s:30<ll (majority opinion).
94. See Acton, 51;; U.S. at 657.
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pragmatic, and founded upon bedrock constitutional law,
Justice Ginsburg states, "The particular testing program
upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse:
Petitioners' policy targets for testing a student population least
likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging
effects."9fi This poignant statement reflects the Court's
traditionally practical and rational character, as reflected in
the language of Mapp v. Ohio: "There is no war between the
Constitution and common sense."96
The foundation of the majority's holding is that
extracurricular activities are voluntary, and thus participation
in them is detached from compulsory attendance laws, and
therefore the students themselves, and not the government,
subject those who participate in extracurricular activities to
drug testing)-J7 This rationale, while superficially appealing,
belies the truly inextricable role "extracurricular" activities
play in public schools. According to Justice Ginsburg:
While extracurricular activities are "voluntary" in the sense
that they are not required for graduation, they are part of the
school's educational program; for that reason, the
petitioner ... is justified in expending public resources to
make them available. Participation in such activities is a key
component of school life, essential in reality for students
applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational
experience.HH

For state governments to force young people to enroll in
their educational programs, and then force them to trade
privacy for participation in the best of those programs in the
name of the public good, is a sly "bait and switch" technique
that compromises the integrity of government schools. It would
be more consistent with the "custodial and tutelary"99 role of
schools to embrace extracurricular participation as an integral
part of the schooling to which children are required to submit.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, students are in fact
compelled by
government
actors
to
participate
m
extracurricular
activities.
These
activities
are
not
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Earls. ;)::Hi U.S. at H4:l (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
867 U.S. 61:1. 6:17 (1961).
See gcncrully ]~uris. 5:l6 U.S. 822.
ld. at H45 (Ginsburg,.]., dissenting).
Acton. 5Hi U.S. at 656.
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extracurricular in any real sense.
Justice Ginsburg further argues that it is absolutely critical
to any search conducted under "special needs" rationale that a
special need actually be demonstrated. 1oo The purported
"special need" in cases involving random urine tests of students
is that there is a nationwide school drug problem.lOl It must
follow, then, that there is no special need, and thus no
justification for a suspicionless testing, where no drug problem
has been adequately demonstrated at the school in question.
The risks of drug abuse are great indeed: ''[D]rug use
carries a variety of health risks for children, including death
from overdose."102 "Those risks, however, are present for all
schoolchildren."l03 It is precisely because of the large scope and
breadth of the school drug problem that the need to combat it is
not "special." A problem that affects all of us, from state to
state and household to household, implicates the constitutional
principles that govern all of us. It is unnecessary and
inappropriate to apply a doctrine designed for application in
unusual circumstances to a patently usual situation. If the
special needs doctrine is used to justify a school drug testing
policy, it should be an absolute prerequisite that the school
district demonstrate the unique severity of the drug culture in
its school.
No such demonstration was made in Earls,104 which makes
it clear that public school administrators who are concerned
about student drug use can implement random drug testing
policies even if no drug use in the school is discovered, and
even if there is little indication of a local drug problem. I();) The
justification offered by the Court is that there is a "nationwide
drug epidemic."106 Unfortunately, it appears the Court has
endorsed a worthless prophylactic at the cost of personal
privacy for millions of young citizens. The tests do not prevent

100. lc'urls. ;:;;l(i U.S. at il42-·Ll (Ginsburg, ,J.. dissl'nting).
101. See, e.g, /d. at 8:34 (majority opinion).
102 !d. at s:Hi-:\7.
10:\. ld. at il4~ (Cinsburg, .)., dissenting).
104. I d. at S4:l (stating that the superintendent ckscribed the clt·ug problem at the
high school as ''not ... major").
lOG. The Tecumseh district's indications of a drug problem included only students
who "appeared to be• [on] drugs," the finding of marijuana in the parking lot. and
concl'l'rwd communit:--· members. ld. at 8:34-:lfl (majorit:; opinion).
HHi. Jd. at i-l:\4.
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drug use.l07 Catching students in the act of using drugs by
means of testing whole groups of students is not a useful
starting point for prevention of drug use: "[T]he strongest
predictor of student drug use is students' attitudes toward drug
use and perceptions of peer use."lOR Research has led to the
conclusion that "a policy [of suspicionless drug testing of high
school studentsl cannot work in the way it is hoped to and will,
for many adolescents, interfere with more sound prevention
and treatment processes."l09 In short, we are dealing with the
powerful forces of peer pressure, teenage culture, and
addiction. A litmus test for drug abuse will be met with
hostility and distrust, and will move teenagers away from, not
toward, getting meaningful help.

IV. STANDING IN THE SHOES OF A PARENT
It is taken for granted that the existence and operation of
public schools is an essential and inevitable aspect of a
progressive, technological society.llO But the Supreme Court
has seemingly led the way toward a public that views public
schooling not only as an institution to serve these societal
changes, but as an institution that is actually central to the
successful development of individual Americans, as people.
This is particularly apparent in the language of Brown u.
Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the

107. Gneg Winll't", Stu.dy Finds No Sign that Testing /)ctcrs Students' Drug Use,
N.Y. TIMES. May 17, ~OO:l. at Al (stating that a large-scale national study found that
"[rl]rug tf•sting in schools does not deter student drug use any mort> than doing no
screening at all").
108. Drug l'olic:-: Alliance. Federal Drug Testing Study Shows lnuasiue Tests Do
l'.'ot
Deter
{,'se.
lltw<:
POLICY
NEWS,
Ma~·
20.
2003.
h ttp:l/www. clrugpol icv .<JI'gin<·ws/OC,_20_03testing.cfm.
109. Brief for t lw ,\nwrican Academy of Pediatrics. Pt a!. as Amici Curiat>
Supporting l{pspond<·nts at 1. Earls. 5:36 U.S. 822 (No. 01-:l:)~).
110. This is tme despite· the fact that the first compulsory public education laws
were not enactPd until the mid-ninetefmth century in America. lnfoplease.com, State
Compulsory School Attl•ndancP Laws, http://www.infoplease.comlipa/A0112617.html
(last visited Apl'. :). ~OOK).
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armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. I l l

If a visitor from another planet arrived in the United States
and read this proclamation, he would likely be shocked that
there exists a government institution with such life-giving,
nurturing, and guiding power. In fact, he might be able to
think of only one similar cultural force-that of the
relationship between parent and child. But is it truly the case
that schools, and not parents, are what allow us to exercise our
"'most basic public responsibilities,"ll2 and that any
"expectations" we may have in life stem not from our families
or communities, but from our government-run schools? If so,
one wonders what the role of parents is when the school day is
over. In loco school, perhaps?
It is often said that school personnel stand in loco parentis
to students. 11 :l That is, parents delegate at least part of their
authority as parents to schools when they drop their children
off in the morning.114 Oddly, courts have rarely endeavored to
define exactly what this delegation entails, or which of the
traditionally "parental" powers are delegated to schools. Courts
seem satisfied with the proposition that schools get some
constitutional leeway in their treatment of students because
they are parent-like.ll5
However, the Supreme Court has itself questioned the
model of in loco parentis in a constitutional context:
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher
as deriving from the parents, the concept of parental
delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant

111. :14 7 U.S. 4il:l. 49:1 ( 19fi4).
112. !d.
11:1. Sec 61:' A\L .ll:ll. :w Schools§ 290 (2008).
114. Toclcl ,\. DP:\'Iitclwll. The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco
Parentis: A Lens for Vie1ring the Sexual Abuse of Students. 2002 BYU EIJUC. & L. J. 17.
1R.

115. Sec, c .." .. Nt·w .Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. :12fi, :1:1o (191:'5) (recognizing the
:ohortcomings of the doctrine of in loco parentis and then falling hack on the parent-like
relationship of schools and students to justify recognition of a lower student privacy
expectation).
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with compulsory education laws-that the State itself may
impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary
"for the proper education of the child and for the maintenance
of group discipline."l Hi

Furthermore, in T.L.O, the Court observed: "Today's public
school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily
conferred on them by individual parents: rather, they act in
furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary
policies."l17
If the authority of school personnel over students is derived
from the state itself, rather than from a delegation of power
from parents to the government, then that authority is not
parent-like at all; it was in fact taken from parents. The states,
through a combination of compulsory attendance laws and in
loco parentis-inspired policies, have "bootstrapped" themselves
into possessing a right to infringe on the personal liberties of
students in a manner similar to a parent. Student-citizens are
mandated to be in the presence of government actors. and the
Supreme Court has used this mandated presence to justify
intrusions on their personal liberties based on the state's own
declaration that it has such rights.
Despite the frequent use of the term in loco parentis, there
are better models for describing the student/school relationship
and drawing analogies for use in making constitutional
decisions about the rights of students, for example, that of the
doctor/patient relationship. The modern approach to public
schooling is astoundingly diagnostic and treatment-oriented.
This has been the case for decades, with states requiring
mandatory testing for academic deficiencies.ll H the federal and
state governments developing intricate devices for the
accommodation of physical, psychological, and learning
disabilities, 119 and perhaps ultimately, with the enactment of
the No Child Left Behind Act,l20 which conditions the very

116. Ingraham\'. Wright. 4:l0 U.S. 6iil. 662

(l~l77)

(quoting I F. H.\liPI-:Il & F .

•JAMES, LAW OF TOiri'S ~ :l.:ZO. 292 (1956)).

117. 469 U.S. at :;:w.
118. See, e.g. !'v11SSOUIU DEI'.\HniE:--JT OF ELE\IE:\T.\liY & SJ·:('O:\IJ.\IlY EDU'.\TIO:\.
ASSESS!IIE:\T

S'L\:--illc\IWS

FOR

MISSOL!HI

I'll llLJ('

St 'IIOOLS

(199H).

http://www. dese. mo. gov/clivimprove/assess/assessmt•ntst a nda rds. pdf
(outlining
the
requirements of thP mandatory Missouri Assessm,nt Program).
119. See, e.g. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 20 U.S C.~~ 1400-H87
(2000).
120. 20 U.S. C. ~~ fi:lO I 6ii7H (Supp. V 2005).
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existence of a public school on progress measured by empirical
data developed and collected by strict adherence to statistical
standards.l21 Two important conclusions can be drawn from
the state of modern schools. First, this is not "parenting;" it is
the application of the scientific method. Second, the academic
progress of a school, as measured by empirical data, is being
given top priority by school administrations over many other
considerations.l22 We want our schools to succeed so badly that
we have commanded them to stop being parents and start
increasing test scores. Therefore, while in loco parentis is not a
dead letter, it is a model for schools that has proper application
only in the minds of Supreme Court Justices.
The diagnostic character of modern public schools is often
confirmed by teachers and administrators with first-hand
knowledge of how schools operate. A recent broadcast on
National Public Radio about the current emphasis on student
achievement data included interviews with public school
teachers in California who spoke in an impressive, analytical
manner one might expect of a scientist.123 A third-grade
teacher described his school's data-driven curriculum as
follows: "It's kind of like a scientific process of shooting a rocket
off. ... That one didn't work. Let's go back to the drawing
board. We're going to add better fins, we're going to streamline
this thing, and we're going to put a parachute on it."124
Traditional
interaction
among
teachers
and
the
administration has taken a backseat to a focus on data and
exacting pedagogical methods. Schools "are throwing out old
practices, such as regular staff meetings that did little more
than take up time. In many schools, teachers only get together
to discuss student achievement data."125 All of this is, of
course, driven by the necessity of schools to meet federal
121. 20 U.S.C. ~ fWJ:l(d) (Supp. V 2005) (describing in detail the thorough
statistical method for measuring achievement that is mandated by federal law).
Kansas
City.
Missouri
School
District
Homepage,
122. See
http://www2.kcmscl.lwt./J>ag·,.s/AboutKCMSD.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). The
homepage states: "When• Achievement Is The Standard." The achievement referred to
is likely not social achi<'V(•nwnt, and it is doubtful that the "standard" is one set by the
students themsc]v,·s. The District makes it clear that "[tjhe students' performance
standards arc> a nitical part of the District's efforts to regain full accreditation." Id.
12:3. Morning Hdition: California Schools Collect Student Data to Help Kids (NPR
radio broadcast .June> 1H. 2007) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php'lstoryld=11151 1-\29).
124. ld.
125. Id.
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standards in order to continue to receive federal funding.l26
Moreover, teachers themselves have a vested interest in the
school's achievement and progress data, because "many people
think that poor performing schools have poor teachers."127
While some teachers, perhaps those with scientific
backgrounds, actually find the data-driven approach
"invigorating,"12H others know something is amiss in this
approach. As one teacher said, "In our minds these aren't little
data people .... I don't see a score. I see a li.ttle person, who I
want the very best life for."l29 While this sentiment is likely
shared by many teachers, raising people is not the task modern
schools have undertaken. They are on a mission to raise
numbers, and they cannot afford to fail. This is strikingly
similar to the way a doctor regards his patients. He is
singularly concerned with finding out what is wrong, applying
the best possible techniques, and achieving positive results.
Because schools regard students as scientific subjects for
educational purposes, one would be consistent in regarding
them as such for constitutional purposes as well.
The Supreme Court addressed the topic of involuntary drug
testing in state-run hospitals in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.l30 In that case, the hospital, without the patients'
permission, tested the urine of pregnant women who were
suspected of using cocaine.l:31 The hospital cited its ultimate
goal of getting pregnant women off drugs and into treatment as
a substantial justification for the searches.l :32 It asserted that
the case should be analyzed under the "special needs"
balancing test.J:'l:l Therefore, as in Acton and Earls, the Court
was potentially confronted with the question of whether the
public's interest in keeping a group of vulnerable people off
126. !d.
127. Jd.
12il. !d.
129. !d.
1:lO. fi:32 U.S. G7 (20(ll).
1 :n. !d. at 70.
L12. See id. at 82; see also Brief of R<~;;pondents at :l. Ferguson. ii::J2 U.S fi7 (No.
99-9:lG) (arguing that not only did the hospital have a direct clinical need to know if
pregnant patients werp using cocaine, hut also had a "broader medical and social need
to stem the tide of an epidemic of maternal dntg use"). Similarly. schools makP the
argument that they have a duty to stem th" tide of an epidemic of studPnt drug use.
See supra text accompanying note 10().
J:l:l. Brief of Respondents, supra 1.'32, at 24 (stating that the drug test;; ckarlv met
"the guiding principle;; and parameters of the special needs doctrine•").
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drugs outweighs the individual's Fourth Amendment privacy
expectations. However, the Court chose not to resort to "special
needs analysis" in Ferguson, stating that the purpose of the
tests was "ultimately indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control."1:34 Thus, the stated purpose was
insufficient to overcome "[t]he Fourth Amendment's general
prohibition
against
nonconsensual,
warrantless,
and
suspicionless searches." 1:35
The "special need" cited in student search cases, keeping
kids off drugs for their own good, is almost identical to the
asserted "special need" the Court rejected in Ferguson, namely,
keeping pregnant women off drugs for their own good.l:36
Because the school/student relationship more closely resembles
the doctor/patient relationship than the parent/child
relationship, and government-run hospital patients have a
recognizable privacy expectation in the contents of their bodily
fluids, government-run school students should be afforded at
least the same constitutional protections as patients. In short,
the need to keep students off drugs is not special; it is
universal, and implicates the full protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Students are not sub-citizens; they are
particularly impressionable citizens who do not "shed their
constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."1:37
V. lNTEIU'ItETING STATE LAWS TO PROVIDE PROTECTIONS
BEYOND THOSE OF FEDERAL LAW

State constitutions typically contain search and seizure
clauses that are nearly identical to the language of the Fourth
Amendment. When a plaintiff sues under both the state and
federal constitutions, the handling by the state court of the
state law claim is a delicate balance among longstanding
principles of federalism, respect for the U.S. Supreme Court,
and practical considerations. For example, the Iowa Supreme
Court, in upholding a suspicionless high school locker search,

1:34. Id. at 81 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 U.S. :l2. 44 (2000)). Unlike the
policies in Acton and !~uris. under the hospital's policy. if a woman tested positive for
eucaine twice. the police would be notified and the patient would he arrested. !d. at 72.
1:'35. ld. at 1-i(i.
1:36. ld. at i-1·1 (claiming that the hospital's true purpose was to use the threat of
arrest to "forcP wonwn into treatment").
1:37. Tinker v. lks Moines, :HJ:l U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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stated, "[W]e usually interpret 'the scope and purpose of [Iowa's
search and smzure provision) to track with federal
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.'"1:3s It does this out
of "[s]pecial respect and deference [to] United States Supreme
Court interpretations of similar language in the federal
constitution." 139
This rather weighty deference is remarkable. considering a
state court need not, when interpreting state law, follow U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that find no violation of the Federal
Constitution (like Acton and Earls). When interpreting state
law, a state court is bound only by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that define the constitutional limitations on state
action.l40 A state is free to provide its c1hzens with
constitutional rights beyond those guaranteed by federal law.
without need for even passing recognition of what the Federal
Constitution does not guarantee.l41 Nonetheless, a state court
will often look to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance in
interpreting a state provision nearly identical to the Federal
Constitution. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding
an Acton-like testing policy, stated, "Although we are not
bound by federal decisions when interpreting our State's
constitution, 'federal decisional law may serve to guide us in
our resolution of New Jersey issues."'142 Therefore, the Earls
decision has led some state courts to adopt a simple "us too"
method of dealing with student search cases, ostensibly
because the federal Justices are so well-respected. This is not
guidance; it is a voluntary abandonment by these state courts
of the principals of federalism that comprise the boundaries
within which the federal government must act. State litigants
are entitled to application of their state's law. not just an

1:1/l. State v..Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 14G (Iowa 200:\) (quoting State v. Bneuer, 577
N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 199/l)).
1:39. State v. Davis. 304 N.W.2d 4:32. 4:l4 (Iowa 19Hl) (citing ]{edmond v ]{a:>. 268
N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1978)).
140. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2 (stating that the judicial power of th'• federal judiciary
"shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under t.his Constitution. the
Laws of the United States. and ... treatiles"). Because the federal govcornnwnt is one of
enumerated powers. such power therefore does not extend to casl'S arising uncl,•r state
law and contemplating no federal issue.
141. See Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch. Dist., il:ln A.2d 7fi, Hil (Pa. 200:l) ("The
cases decided under [the Pennsylvania Constitution] have recogniz,·d a strong not ion of
privacy, which is greater than that of tht- Fourth AmPndmPnt.").
142. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'! High Sch. Bel. of Educ .. H2fi i\.2d 624. fi:):; (1\ ..J.
2003) (quoting State v. Cooke. 7fil A.2d 92, 99 (N ..J. 2000)).
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assumption that federal law has them covered.
One state court of last resort, also looking to the Supreme
Court for guidance, found it in a Justice's losing argument. In
her dissenting opinion in Earls, Justice Ginsburg characterized
the school's policy as "perverse," because it targets for testing
those students who are least likely to use drugs,143 and
··s:·nnbolic,"' and thus unconstitutional, because the policy is
meant primarily to express the school's abhorrence of drug
use.l44 In Theodore u. Delaware Valley School District, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting a provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution substantially similar to the Fourth
Amendment, 11;; agreed. I ,Hi
The Pennsylvania high court held that the Delaware Valley
School District was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
based on the intervening Earls decision, because there were
pressing questions concerning Pennsylvania's four-part test for
the legality of school searches. Under the test, the four factors
that must be balanced are: "(1) the students' privacy interests,
(2) the nature of the intrusion created by the search, (3) notice,
and (4) 'the overall purpose to be achieved by the search and
the immediate reasons prompting the decision to conduct the
actual search."' 1·17 This test is derived from the decision in
Acton, though the two standards are not identical.14H
Rejecting the notion in Earls that students' privacy rights
implicated by the tests are trivial, the Pennsylvania court
found it critical that the school district had offered no reason to
believe a drug problem actually existed in its schools.149 As a
further indication that the fourth factor of the test was not met,
the court quoted Justice Ginsburg's dissent m Earls:
"Nationwide. students who participate in extracurricular
activities are significantly less likely to develop substance

14.'1. Bd. of Educ. v. ]•;a rls, ;);\(j U.S. 822, 84.3 (2002) (Ginsburg, ,J.. dissenting).
hi. at S;).J.
Article l. ~ K ol' tlw l'c·nnsylvania Constitution neads: "The people shall be
,;c·cm·c· in their p<·rsons. h"usc·s. papc•rs and possessions from unreasonable searches
ancl st>izures. and no warmnt to search any place or to sc•izP an:-· person or things shall
issut· without c!Pscrihing t lwm as nearly as may hP. nor without probable cause.
supportecl\l\· oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant."
14fi. tl:Ofi A.2d /(i (l'a 200:l).
147. ld. at SK (qu"ting In 1'1' F.B .. 726 A.2cl 361. 36i'i (Pa. 1999)).

144.
14;).

148.

ld.

H9.

lr/. at 90 91.
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abuse problems than are their less-involved peers."l :50
In an imaginary war, the Pennsylvania school district had
taken aim at innocent bystanders. It would be naive to assume
that students did not notice they were not trusted to make
important choices for themselves. It would be dangerous to
assume this caused no harm. The culture gap widens and the
drug war escalates. While the Pennsylvania court's drawing of
a line between Acton and Earls was constitutionally
appropriate,
more
importantly,
it
recognized
that
"[g]overnment is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."l:'il The lesson
taught by suspicionless drug testing is that it is okay to set
trust aside for the sake of knowledge.
Similarly, under California law, it appears that random,
suspicionless drug searches are unconstitutional. The test for
whether a student search is allowable in California is similar to
the "reasonable suspicion" test articulated in T.L.0:J;32 "[T]his
standard requires articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, warranting an objectively
reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be
searched are violating or have violated a rule, regulation, or
statute."l53 However, the Supreme Court of California limited
the potential scope of the standard by stating, "The corollary to
this rule is that a search of a student by a public school official
is unlawful if predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or
hunch."l54 As to each tested student, it cannot be said that a
random, suspicionless drug test is based on notably more than
curiosity or a hunch. The court also made clear that California
law itself, and not a delegation of parental power, was the basis
for this standard: "While most [courts] balance the interests of
the student against in loco parentis responsibilities of school
officials, we prefer . . . to view these countervailing
governmental interests as statutorily, rather than common
law, based."155

150. I d. at 92 (quoting Bel. of Educ. v. Earls, );)() U.S. 1-'L!L!. 1-'i):l (:2002) (Ginsburg ..J..
dissenting)).
151. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 4:3il. 4Si'i (192S)
152. New .Jersey v. T.L.O .. 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (10Hfi).
153. In re William G., 7ml P.2d 1287, 1295 (Cal. 19Si'i).

154.

I d. at 1L!96.

15:). ld.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the need to keep Americans, and especially young
Americans, from abusing dangerous recreational drugs is
obvious, the need to instill within young people faith in the
United States Constitution and its foundation of personal
liberty guarantees is even more profound and critical to the
identity of our nation. Public school students have no reason to
trust the liberty guarantees of our Constitution when they are
not themselves trusted. But besides the fact that random,
suspicionless drug testing is an unworkable and undesirable
practice, there is reason to determine that it is also illegal.
Because the federal government has not done so, the states
should reaffirm that their most important citizens possess the
most important rights of citizens.

Tony LaCroix

